

OFFICE/SECTION

EUR-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

DATE 11 APR 1969

|      |      |      |
|------|------|------|
| RM/R | RIP  | AF   |
| 1    |      |      |
| ARA  | EUR  | FE   |
|      |      |      |
| NEA  | CU   | INR  |
|      |      | 5    |
| E    | P    | IO   |
|      | 2    | 5    |
| L    | 5/1  | AID  |
| J/PM | ACDA | 5/5  |
| 1    | 17   | 10   |
| AGR  | COM  | FRB  |
|      |      |      |
| INT  | LAB  | TAR  |
|      |      |      |
| TR   | XMB  | AIR  |
|      |      | 5    |
| ARMY | CIA  | NAVY |
| 3    | 20   | 5    |
| OSD  | USIA | NSA  |
| 34   | 10   | 3    |
| HSC  |      |      |
| 6    |      |      |

A-145  
NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, MOSCOW, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW, US MISSION NATO, USUN, ZAGREB, US MISSION GENEVA

FROM : Amembassy BELGRADE

SUBJECT : Yugoslav Strategist on AEM Decision

REF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A clear and evenly-balanced statement of Yugoslav views on the US decision to proceed with deployment of the Sentinel F.M. system in a "thin" configuration was provided March 20 in Komunist, the weekly journal of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), under the by-line of Major General Berislav BADURINA, Yugoslavia's senior strategic theorist. On the basis of his analysis of the reasons underlying the decision General Badurina concludes that military and strategic conclusions were not of predominant importance, but that military-strategic aspects of the decision may have the most serious consequences for world peace and security, since influential forces on the other side also believe in negotiating from positions of strength.

In Badurina's analysis the decision was based primarily on considerations of domestic politics and economics, although he also points out that it strengthens the American military and psychological position in preparation for a summit meeting with the Soviet leaders. Domestic considerations allegedly involved include: President NIXON's desire to strengthen his reputation with the American people by emphasizing his concern for national security; the usefulness of the technological "fall-out" from research and development of the system in keeping US industry ahead of any competitors; the influence of the "military-industrial complex", which may eventually bring about deployment of a "thick" system; and the usefulness of the expenditures on the system in offsetting possible reductions in military procurement as a result of a reduction of US military involvement in Viet-Nam or elsewhere, thus permitting maintenance of US technological and industrial capabilities at the highest level and assisting American companies in preserving their privileged position in both the

Decontrol following March 24, 1970

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR/DEPT. USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL: BEMorlon eqp 3-24-69

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: IMTobin

Clearances: POL: RCMadd

DAO: MBorodkin

MAR 30 PM 1 48

OW  
REL  
Pmm  
Dm  
LB  
RM  
ES  
LR  
VB  
K  
DEB  
GRK  
COPY TO PER

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

domestic and foreign markets. Furthermore, Badurina suggests, the decision to deploy a "thin" system may be a means of preparing the American public psychologically to accept an eventual decision to go ahead with a "thick" system.

In reaching the decision another basic consideration, writes Badurina, was the mutual interest of the US and the USSR in avoiding at any price a direct confrontation that might lead to nuclear war. This mutual interest causes the two powers to seek to maintain a stable balance of power between them, but at present this balance is proceeding along an upward trend in armaments development. Thus, the two powers consider both the advantages for themselves of any innovation in weapons and the difficulties which it may cause the other side. In line with this, Badurina says, President Nixon took pains in his announcement (and probably in other channels) to assure the Soviets that Sentinel deployment would not change the existing balance by decreasing the effectiveness of the Soviet missile forces. Badurina doubts that this assurance will be effective and fears that a new arms race with unforeseeable consequences is likely.

Comment. In his commentary Badurina states authoritatively the basic Yugoslav policy concern about any apparent escalation in US-USSR competition. His statements about US use of its technological and economic capabilities to maintain or increase its relative advantage over other countries and about the military-industrial complex, which could have easily been given an anti-American slant, are kept carefully neutral; in fact, in his mention of US ability to use profitably technological fall-out from weapons development, a certain amount of admiration or envy is apparent.

His statement that the ABM decision strengthens the US position in any forthcoming summit talks is carefully phrased so that it indicates neither approval nor disapproval of that aspect. All suggestion of disapproval of the decision is based on the possibility that it may contribute to accelerating the arms race and on the doubts of the effectiveness of the system expressed by its American opponents. In addition to expressing Yugoslav fears of escalation of the arms race, Badurina's commentary, in its reference to the super-powers' desire to avoid nuclear confrontation at any cost, brings up a constant Yugoslav concern; fear that in case of either confrontation or broad-scale

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Page 3 of 3

Belgrade A- 145

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

agreement between the great powers Yugoslavia might find itself only a pawn to be surrendered in the interests of avoiding nuclear war. All in all, Badurina's treatment of the President's decision on the ABM substantially is the same as might be found in the press of Western Europe or of the US itself, for that matter.

ELBRICK



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE